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The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (“Korematsu Center”), based
at Seattle University School of Law, advances justice through research, advocacy, and
education. Currently, the Korematsu Center is making ongoing efforts to study the racial
disproportionality that exists within our criminal justice system. The Korematsu Center
does not, in this brief or otherwise, represent the official views of Seattle University.
The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (“AACAP”) is a
medical membership association established by child and adolescent psychiatrists in
1953.

Now over 8,700 members strong, AACAP is the leading national medical

association dedicated to treating and improving the quality of life for the estimated 7-15
million American youth under 18 years of age who are affected by emotional, behavioral,
developmental and mental disorders. AACAP’s members actively research, evaluate,
diagnose, and treat psychiatric disorders, and pride themselves on giving direction to and
responding quickly to new developments in addressing the health care needs of children
and their families.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In Graham v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court held that sentencing
juveniles to life without parole for non-homicide offenses constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). The Court reasoned that youth are less culpable than
adults because of biological difference in brain development that render youth more
immature, more likely to engage in risky behavior, and more vulnerable to external
influences like peer pressure. Id. at 91-92. Additionally, because youth brains are still
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are more transient and capable of change than adult personalities. Id. at 68-69. The
undisputed scientific data confirms that youth cannot be expected to act as mature adults.
The Supreme Court clarified and extended the Graham decision in Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). There, the Court found that because youth offenders
were less culpable due to the characteristics noted in Graham, imposing mandatory life
sentences without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders constituted
cruel and unusual punishment. Taken together, the Court’s decisions in Graham and
Miller mandate that when sentencing youth offenders, a court must consider as mitigating
factors the characteristics that make youth offenders different.
The Petitioner’s sentence must be vacated because, pursuant to the Graham and
Miller framework, youth offenders are less culpable and are entitled to a meaningful
opportunity for release.

In addition to concluding that Miller may be applied

retroactively, amici respectfully request that the Court provide guidance to the lower
courts on how to apply Missouri sentencing statutes in a constitutional fashion so that
youth offenders have the opportunity to seek parole and become productive members of
society. Providing this constitutionally-mandated opportunity is especially important
here, where the Petitioners’ early life was scarred by poverty, despair, and fear.

2
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developing well into late adolescence, the Court determined that their personality traits

I.

Medical Research on Brain Development Confirms That Youth Offenders

Under 18 Years of Age Are Categorically Different From Adult Offenders With
Regard to Culpability, Susceptibility to Deterrence, Vulnerability to Peer Pressure,
and Capacity to Change.
A youth’s mind is different. Science, law, and social values have all recognized
this essential fact. In Roper v. Simmons, Graham, and Miller, the Court recognized that a
youth’s culpability “is diminished, to a substantial degree” based on biological
differences between a youth’s brain and an adult’s brain. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 571 (2005) (emphasis added).

These biological distinctions have long been

recognized by common-sense and ratified by our society’s laws which “recognize[] a host
of distinctions between the rights and duties of children and those of adults.” New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 n.2 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).1

1

For example, Missouri has enacted numerous protective laws to keep youth from

purchasing, using, or possessing certain substances or items. See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. §
311.325 (prohibiting persons under twenty-one years of age from purchasing or
possessing alcohol); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.931 (prohibiting minors from purchasing or
obtaining tobacco products). Further, the state has categorically barred minors from
playing in authorized gambling activities. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 572.020. Similarly, minors
are limited in their ability to contract, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 431.056, or even mark their bodies
with a tattoo without parental consent. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 324.520.

3
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ARGUMENT

categorical differences that separate youths from adults: (1) a propensity to engage in
risky behavior; (2) a susceptibility to external pressures; and (3) a transient personality
with a penchant for change. Graham, 560 U.S. at 71-76. “Juveniles’ susceptibility to
immature and irresponsible behavior means ‘their irresponsible conduct is not as morally
reprehensible as that of an adult.’” Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (citation omitted). Science
now verifies what law and common sense have always known to be true: because youth
minds are different, youth offenders must be treated differently than adult offenders.2
A.

Because Youth Brains Are Structurally Hardwired in Ways That
Promote Risky and Impulsive Behavior, Adult Sanctions Do Not Deter
Youth Misconduct.

The notion that youth, as a group, are prone to impulsive behavior is not simply a
stereotype. Indeed, various studies have confirmed that youth “exhibit a disproportionate

Federal law also recognizes youth incompetency in certain activities.

Under

10 U.S.C. § 505(a), a person must be eighteen to serve in the military without parental
consent. Federal law also prohibits, with certain exceptions, persons under the age of
eighteen from possessing a handgun or handgun ammunition. 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2), (5).
2

Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:

Developmental Immaturity Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty,
58 AM. PSYCHOL. 1009, 1011-13 (2003).

4
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These judicially and legislatively recognized distinctions are based on three

developmental psychiatrists have found that reckless and sensation seeking behavior
peaks during adolescence.4 This behavior often involves criminal activities such as drunk
driving and drug use, and reckless conduct such as unprotected sex.5 In particular,
violent crimes “peak sharply” in late adolescence (ages 16 and 17).6 This is due, in part,
because youth overvalue rewards and minimize risks, thereby skewing their cost calculus

3

Linda Patia Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations,

24 NEUROSCI. & BIOBEHAV. REVS. 417, 421 n.1 (2000).
4

Beatrice Luna, The Maturation of Cognitive Control and the Adolescent Brain, in

FROM ATTENTION TO GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR 250 (Francisco Aboitiz &
Diego Cosmelli, eds.) (2009).
5

“[I]n laboratory experiments and studies across a wide range of adolescent populations,

developmental psychologists [have shown] that adolescents are risk takers who inflate the
benefits of crime and sharply discount its consequences, even when they know the law.”
Jeffrey Fagan, Why Science and Development Matter in Juvenile Justice, THE
AMERICAN PROSPECT, Aug. 14, 2005, at 2.
6

Terrie Moffit, Adolescent-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A

Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 685-86 (1993).

5
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amount of reckless behavior, sensation seeking and risk taking.”3 In fact, across cultures,

The overvaluing of rewards has been observed to be

particularly pronounced when youth are interacting with other adolescents.8
Recent brain imaging studies have found a biological link between risk-taking
behavior and pre-frontal brain development.9 In particular, youth brains show increased
neural activity in parts of the brain linked to risky behavior,10 and less activity in the
prefrontal cortex, which continues to mature through late adolescence.11

Prefrontal

cortex maturation is especially important when gauging youth culpability because that

7

Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 16:3 ANN. REV.

CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 47, 57 (2009) [hereinafter "Steinberg 2009"].
8

Laurence Steinberg. Does Recent Research on Adolescent Brain Development Inform

the Mature Minor Doctrine? 38.3 J. MED. & PHIL. 256, 260 (2013).
9

James Bjork et al., Developmental Differences in Posterior Mesofrontal Cortex

Recruitment by Risky Rewards, 27 J. NEUROSCI. 4839 (2007).
10

Robert Shepherd, The Relevance of Brain Research to Juvenile Justice, 19 CRIM.

JUST. 51, 52 (2005) ("[T]here are clear neurological explanations for the difficulties
adolescents have in cognitive functioning, in exercising mature judgment, in controlling
impulses, in weighing the consequences of actions, in resisting the influence of peers, and
in generally becoming more responsible.").
11

Casey, B. J. et al., The Adolescent Brain, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL. REV. 62, 68

(2008).

6
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when making decisions.7

judgments13 and evaluating future consequences.14 Moreover, the ability to regulate
one’s emotions – a crucial element of behavior control15 – does not fully develop until
post-adolescence.16
As a result, youth brains develop with a structural imbalance that effectively
promotes poor decision making: the areas that motivate reckless behavior mature sooner
than the areas that regulate such behavior.17 Put simply, the youth brain is literally hardwired to promote poor decision making. Because youth brains are biologically less

12

Samantha B. Wright et al., Neural Correlates of Fluid Reasoning in Children and

Adults, 1:8 FRONTIERS HUM NEUROSCI. 7 (2008) (prefrontal cortex controls
reasoning).
13

Jorge Moll et al., Frontopolar and Anterior Temporal Cortex Activation in a Moral

Judgment Task: Preliminary Functional MRI Results in Normal Subjects, 59 ARQ
NEURO-PSQUIATR 657 (2001).
14

Antoine Bechera et al., Characterization of the Decision-Making Deficit of Patients

with Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Lesions, 123 BRAIN 2189, 2189-99 (2000).
15

Sang Hee Kim & Stephan Hamann, Neural Correlates of Positive and Negative

Emotion Regulation, 19:5 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 776, 776 (2007).
16

Casey, supra note 11, at 65.

17

Steinberg 2009, supra note 7, at 54.

7
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part of the brain is associated with decision making generally,12 including making moral

[risk-taking] behavior during adolescence.”19
Additionally, experience and scientific research confirm that long sentences such
as life without parole do nothing to deter youth offenders because their limited life
experiences make it difficult for them to weigh consequences and perceive long stretches
of time.20 Indeed, “Roper noted that ‘the same characteristics that render juveniles less

18

Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (lm)Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence:

Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 742
(2000).
19

Spear, supra note 3. See also Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A

Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 344 (1992) (noting that
over half of youth reported driving drunk, using drugs, engaging in other criminal acts).
20

“Few adolescents are likely to be able to grasp the true significance of a life sentence.

One twenty-nine-year-old woman serving life without parole told a researcher for this
report that when she was sentenced, at the age of sixteen: ‘I didn't understand “life
without” ... [that] to have “life without,” you were locked down forever. You know it
really dawned on me when [after several years in prison, a journalist] came and ... he
asked me, “Do you realize that you’re gonna be in prison for the rest of your life?” And I
said, “Do you really think that? You know ... and I was like, “For the rest of my life? Do
you think that God will leave me in prison for the rest of my life?’” Human Rights
Watch, “'The Rest of Their Lives,” supra note 2, at 4-5.

8
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“capable” of regulating their behavior,18 “[i]t is statistically aberrant to refrain from such

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 571); see also Miller, 132 S.Ct.
at 2465.21 In one study, researchers found that the threat of adult sanctions had no
deterrent effect whatsoever on youth crime.22 In sum, there is a strong biological basis
for the notion that youth offenders are less culpable than their adult counterparts.
B.

Youth Are Particularly Vulnerable to External Pressures at Home and
From Peers.

Another reason youth are less culpable than adults is because they are uniquely
susceptible to negative external influences and peer pressure. First, youth are not old
enough to control or remove themselves from negative environments, which can
undermine decision making. In particular, youth are “dependent on living circumstances
of their parents and families and hence are vulnerable to the impact of conditions well

21

“Because juveniles’ lack of maturity and under-developed sense of responsibility ...

often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions,” Johnson v. Texas, 509
U.S. 350, 367 (1993), they are less likely to take a possible punishment into consideration
when making decisions. This is particularly so when that punishment is rarely imposed.”
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028-29.
22

Eric L. Jensen & Linda Metsger, A Test of the Deterrent Effect of Legislative Waiver

on Violence Juvenile Crime, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 96, 100-02 (1994).

9

Electronically Filed - SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI - December 01, 2014 - 03:23 PM

culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.”

Put differently, youth are not old enough to “extricate

themselves from a criminogenic setting.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; see also id. (noting
that “juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape
negative influences in their whole environment”).
Second, youth brains are more sensitive to certain emotional triggers, such as fear,
rejection, and the desire to “fit in,” making them particularly vulnerable to peer
pressure.24 In fact, the parts of the brain associated with resistance to peer influence are
still developing well into late adolescence.25 One study found that peer pressure doubles
risky behavior, including criminal behavior, among youth.26

Peer pressure can be

especially pronounced in the gang context, where the data indicate enormous group

23

Alan E. Kazdin, Adolescent Development, Mental Disorders, and Decision making of

Delinquent Youths, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 33 (Thpmas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz,
eds., 2000).
24

Laurence Steinberg & Kathryn C. Monahan, Age Differences in Resistance to Peer

Pressure, 43 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1531, 1536-38 (2007).
25

Steinberg 2009, supra note 7, at 56.

26

Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking. Risk Preference

and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 625, 626-34 (2005).

10

Electronically Filed - SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI - December 01, 2014 - 03:23 PM

beyond their control.”23

other teens can directly influence adolescents’ decisions and actions.28

It is no

coincidence that most youth crime is group youth crime.29
Together, these two vulnerabilities – an inability to control their external
environment and a susceptibility to peer pressure – combine to make youth less culpable.
These pressures were particularly salient for the four Petitioners. Petitioner Griffin was
beaten by his stepfather and went through 13 schools in 11 years. Petitioner McElroy
grew up in a violent environment of gangs and suffered from abuse at home. Petitioner
Lockhart also grew up surrounded by gang violence and had his house sprayed with

27

See Michele Mouttapa et al., I'm Mad and I'm Bad: Links Between Self-Identification

as a Gangster, Symptoms of Anger, and Alcohol Use Among Minority Juvenile Offenders,
8 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUVENILE J. 71 (2010) (finding that identifying with a “gang
member peer group” increases the likelihood of destructive behavior such as heavy
alcohol use).
28

Alexandra O. Cohen and B. J. Casey. Rewiring Juvenile Justice: The Intersection of

Developmental Neuroscience and Legal Policy, 18.2 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 63, 65
(2014).
29

Franklin Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender, in YOUTH ON

TRIAL 281 (2000) (“No matter the crime, if a teenager is the offender, he is usually not
committing the offense alone.”); Moffit, supra note 5, at 686-88 (finding a strong
correlation between a youth's propensity to commit a crime and peer delinquency).

11
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pressure exists to engage in self destructive behavior.27 Indeed, the mere presence of

Petitioner Collier experienced peer pressure in

assisting a friend to scare the friend’s parole officer. Long before the Petitioners became
prisoners in the Missouri Department of Corrections, they were trapped in environments
they could not shape or escape. These environments profoundly affect the calculus of
culpability.
C.

The Same Factors That Make Youth Less Culpable Than Adults Also
Make Them More Capable of Change. Life Sentences Without Parole
Fail to Recognize This Potential For Rehabilitation.

“[I]ncorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 73 (internal
citation omitted). Adolescence is a time of remarkable change and transience, when youth
are still struggling to form a basic identity. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (noting that “[t]he
personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed” than those of adults). Youth
crime reflects this transient period and is one of the “qualities of youth” itself, rather than
a sign of an intractably bad character. Id. Although violent crime peaks around 16 and
17 years, it “drop[s] precipitously in to young adulthood.”30 In fact, developmental
psychiatrists have found that the vast majority of youth offenders will stop committing
crime once they are adults,31 and very few youth offenders develop intractable or long
term problems with criminality.32 This capacity for change is a crucial distinction

30

Moffit, supra note 5, at 675.

31

Steinberg & Scott, supra note 2, at 1015.

32

Id.

12

Electronically Filed - SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI - December 01, 2014 - 03:23 PM

bullets when he was 16 years old.

misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility
exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be reformed.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 68
(quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
Youth characteristics are so malleable that “[i]t is difficult even for expert
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.”

Id. at 73 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573).

If trained

psychiatrists cannot distinguish between those rare youth offenders who are incorrigible
from the majority who are capable of change, then surely trial judges (and prosecutors)
cannot do so either.33 “The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity
means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a
juvenile is evidence of [an] irretrievably depraved character.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
Echoing its reasoning in Roper, the Court made clear in Graham and Miller that there is
no reliable way – either for a prosecutor or a sentencing judge – to determine when a
youth offender's crimes are the result of “irreparable corruption,” and no reliable way to

33

In fact, vexed researchers have found that those youth offenders who change and those

who continue committing crimes exhibit identical behavior at the outset, making it
impossible to identify incorrigible offenders. Edward Mulvey & Elizabeth Cauffman,
The Inherent Limits of Predicting School Violence, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 797, 799
(2001).

13
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between youth offenders and adult offenders. “From a moral standpoint it would be

sentences, therefore, cannot rest on the assumption that they are irredeemably depraved.
Additionally, because youth have such tremendous capacity for change and
rehabilitation, Roper and Graham emphasized that youth offenders should not be given
irreversible sentences. Life without parole sentences “share some characteristics with
death sentences that are shared by no other sentences.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 69. Like
the death penalty, a life without parole sentence “does not even purport to serve a
rehabilitative function.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1028 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).34 Additionally, like the death penalty, these life sentences are irreversible
because the years Petitioners will serve can never be returned, and their sentences can
only end with death.35 This sentence, like the death sentence, effectively condemns
Petitioners to die in prison whether or not they demonstrate what most youth offenders
eventually demonstrate: a matured moral character that warrants a second chance. In this
way, a life without parole sentence “deprives children of both any hope for return to

34

Notably, the United States Supreme Court explicitly found in Miller that Harmelin did

not preclude the Court’s holding that life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate
the Eighth Amendment.
35

“The State does not execute the offender sentenced to life without parole, but the

sentences alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable. It deprives the
convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration.” Graham, 560 U.S.
at 69.

14
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conclude that a youth offender ought to die in prison. Sentencing the Petitioners to life

clemency does not change this calculus. Graham, 560 U.S. at 70 (“the remote possibility
of [executive clemency] does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence”).
Given that the vast majority of youth offenders do change, and that judges cannot
predict whether they will not, the Court in Miller opted for a categorical rule against
mandatory life without parole sentences for youth offenders, even for first-degree murder
convictions. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. The Petitioners’ life sentences under Missouri’s
statute directly conflict with the Court’s holding in Miller, and must therefore be vacated.
II.

Given the Court’s Holding in Miller, this Court Should Find Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 565.020 Unconstitutional as Applied to Juveniles, and Find That Petitioners Must
be Resentenced With Miller’s Considerations Explicitly Taken Into Account.
A.

For Graham and Miller to be Given Constitutional Effect, Miller Must
be Applied Retroactively and Petitioners Should be Resentenced.

Graham and Miller make clear that juveniles must have a meaningful opportunity
for release. Petitioners have never received one, and Miller must be applied retroactively
to give Petitioners this opportunity.

Only by applying Miller retroactively will

Petitioners ever receive a “meaningful opportunity” to obtain release as required by the
United States Constitution.

36

Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment

to Constitutional Disclosure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 162 (2007).

15
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society and any opportunity for rehabilitation.”36 The remote possibility of gubernatorial

Miller, its disposition of the consolidated companion case of Kuntrell Jackson
demonstrates that it intended its decision to be retroactive. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461-62.
As with the Petitioners here, Jackson’s conviction was final, but after the Arkansas
Supreme Court affirmed his convictions, “Jackson filed a state petition for habeas
corpus.” Id. at 2461. The Supreme Court granted relief to Jackson, reversing the
decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court, and remanding for an individualized
resentencing allowing “a judge or jury [to] have the opportunity to consider mitigating
circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.” Id. at 2475.
If Miller were not retroactive, Jackson could not have obtained this relief. A “new
rule becomes retroactive…simply by the action of the Supreme Court.” Tyler v. Cain,
533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001). Further, Miller rested directly on the Court’s prior decisions in
Roper and Graham, both of which have been found to be retroactive. Because Jackson
obtained relief from the Supreme Court on collateral review, Miller applies retroactively
to all individuals seeking review after their convictions have become final. See Tyler v.
Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 668-669 (O’Connor, J. concurring) (“[I]f we hold in Case One that a
particular type of rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and hold in Case
Two that a given rule is of that particular type, then it necessarily follows that the given
rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.”).
Amici will not rehash the Petitioners’ detailed analysis regarding the retroactive
application of Miller.

It is worth noting, however, that in announcing Miller, the

Supreme Court relied significantly on the research and analysis that youth offenders are
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Although the United States Supreme Court did not directly address retroactivity in

Petitioners a meaningful opportunity to obtain release by demonstrating their capacity for
rehabilitation. For example, Petitioner Griffin has completed numerous programs while
incarcerated and has demonstrated the capacity for rehabilitation recognized in the
scientific research. Petitioner Lockhart has successfully completed his GED, become
vice-president of a hospice program, and completed numerous other vocational and
behavioral courses. Most significantly, Petitioner Lockhart has removed himself from
the gang violence of his past and founded an anti-gang program (“Critical Change”)
while incarcerated.
Principles of justice and fairness demand that Petitioners receive a hearing on their
capacity for rehabilitation because “children are constitutionally different from adults for
purposes of sentencing.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.
B.

Principles of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation Require a
Finding That Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.020 is Unconstitutional as Applied to
Juveniles, and the Appropriate Remedy is For Petitioners to be
Resentenced.

The United States Supreme Court has “held on multiple occasions that a
sentencing rule permissible for adults may not be so for children.” Miller, 132 S. Ct. at
2470 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Graham, 560 U.S. 48). Because Missouri Revised
Statute § 565.020 mandates that anyone, including a child, who is convicted of
committing murder in the first degree be sentenced to life without parole, it is

17
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different from adult offenders. A finding that Miller is not retroactive would deny

vacate Petitioners’ sentences and remand for constitutionally-mandated resentencing.
Section 565.020 provides:
1. A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if he knowingly
causes the death of another person after deliberation upon the matter.
2. Murder in the first degree is a class A felony, and the punishment shall
be either death or imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation or
parole, or release except by act of the governor;…
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.020.
Here, the only possible sentence for Petitioners under the statute was a life
sentence without the possibility of parole. “The trial court only may impose a sentence
that is authorized by law and…the only sentence authorized by section 556.020 [sic]
when a juvenile is found guilty of first-degree murder is life without parole.” State v.
Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 235 (Mo. 2013). In State v. Hart, a case on direct appeal, this
Court explained that Miller requires an individualized sentencing assessment before a
court could impose a life sentence pursuant to section 565.020. Id. at 239.
On remand, if the sentencer conducts the individualized assessment
required by Miller and is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that
sentencing Hart to life in prison without parole is just and appropriate under
all the circumstances, the trial court must impose that sentence. If the
sentencer is not persuaded that this sentence is just and appropriate, section
565.020 is void as applied to him because it fails to provide a
18
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unconstitutional as applied to children. See id. at 2460. Therefore, this Court should

convicted of first-degree murder and the trial court must find him guilty of
second-degree murder instead.
Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 235, 239 (emphasis added).
Petitioners here did not receive an individualized sentencing assessment and,
therefore, under Miller and Hart, the appropriate remedy for Petitioners is to have their
prior sentences vacated and be resentenced on remand. Pursuant to Hart, if the lower
courts do not find beyond a reasonable doubt that a life sentence for Petitioners is just and
appropriate, then the sentence of life imprisonment without parole under section 565.020
is unconstitutional and void as to Petitioners. Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 242. The lower courts
must then enter a new finding that Petitioners are guilty of second-degree murder under
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.021, and resentence them pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.011.1(1).
Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 242-43.37
In the resentencing, “the trial court should instruct the jury, before it begins its
deliberations, that if it is not persuaded [beyond a reasonable doubt] that life without
parole is a just and appropriate sentence under all the circumstances of the case,

37

Second-degree murder under section 565.021.1(1) is a lesser-included offense of first-

degree murder. Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 242, n.8h. Second-degree murder convictions
provide for a sentencing range of 10 to 30 years or life with the possibility of parole. Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 558.011.1(1).
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constitutionally permissible punishment. In that event, Hart cannot be

sentences can then be considered at that time. Id. at 242.
Further, this Court should explicitly direct the lower courts to consider the
following factors under Miller as to whether a life sentence is just and appropriate: (1)
minors have substantially lessened culpability than adults; (2) minors are more prone to
risky and reckless behavior than adults; (3) cognitive processes are substantially
diminished in minors compared to adults; (4) minors are especially susceptible to peer
pressure and negative environments in committing crimes; and (5) minors have a greater
capacity for change and rehabilitation than adult offenders. Given the U.S. Supreme
Court’s “doubt[s] [about] the penological justifications for imposing life without parole
on juveniles, Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466, only this approach will give Miller constitutional
effect so as to provide juvenile offenders individualized sentencing.

Without clear

direction to consider these key “mitigating qualities of youth,” Petitioners will not
actually receive an individualized sentencing as mandated by the Supreme Court that
considers the factors critical to the Supreme Court’s analysis. See id., 132 S. Ct. at 2467,
2470.
Clear direction to lower courts as to the procedure and relevant factors for
resentencing the Petitioners will prevent confusion in the lower courts, promote efficient
judicial administration, and allow for the goals of Miller to be effectuated. See State v.
Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003) (endorsing effective administration of justice
when applying new standards retroactively).
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additional instructions concerning applicable punishments” and the possibility of lesser

“[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when
a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.” Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982). Thirty-two years after Eddings, scientific research
confirms that youth offenders cannot be expected to think or behave like adults.
Recognizing these differences, the Supreme Court articulated a rule that youth offenders
must receive an individualized sentencing that considers the factors explored in Miller.
The Eighth Amendment does not guarantee that Petitioners will not spend their
lives in prison, but it does forbid statutory schemes that make the judgment at the outset,
whether that judgment was made for youths in the past or going forward. Because
Petitioners never received an opportunity to present mitigating factors, show their
potential for rehabilitation, or have the Miller factors considered, their sentences must be
vacated, with direction to resentence pursuant to the factors discussed herein.
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CONCLUSION

The undersigned hereby certifies that pursuant to Rule 84.06(c), this brief: (1)
contains the information required by Rule 55.03; (2) complies with the limitations in Rule
84.06(b); and (3) contains 4,861 words, as determined using the word-count feature of
Microsoft Office Word 2013. The undersigned further certifies that the electronic file has
been scanned and was found to be virus-free.

/s/ Bradley M. Bakker
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